NSC BRIEFING DOCUMENTNO.

25 July 1957

I. Communists have registered spectacular gains in recent local elections in Java.

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- A. In central Java elections on 17 July (for provincial council, 26 of 28 district councils and several municipal councils). with about quarter of vote counted, Commies are leading.
  - 1. They have 2 to 1 edge over nearest rivals -- Nationalists, who won in '55 -- with Moslem parties trailing far behind.
  - 2. Of 18 districts and cities which have reported, 14 have swung to Commies.
- B. Although half of counted vote is from cities where Commies have always been strong, enough of rural vote is available to indicate significant Commie gains in those areas also.
- C. This trend was also apparent in Djakarta municipal elections on 22 June, where Commies increased their vote by 40% over 1955 despite smaller turn-out.
- 1. They rose from a poor fourth to strong second behind Masjumi.
- II. Communist success due to energetic, well-financed campaigning.
  - A. Other important factors have been Communist identification with President Sukarno and his concept of "guided democracy", latter's refusal to support Nationalists as he did in '55.
- III. Momentum built up as result of Djakarta and Central Java voting will stand Communists in good stead for future local elections in two remaining Central Java districts (27 July), East Java (29 July) and Jogjakarta—a sultanate having provincial status (somapine electro 201/30; CIA\_RDPZ9R00890A000800090018-1

- A. Communists are working hard in all these areas, and probably will win remaining districts of Central Java and Jogjakarta.
- B. East Java, however, will test capacity of Communists to win in a Moslem stronghold.
  - In '55 Nadhlatul Flama (NU) won a substantial plurality, defeating second place Communists by more than a million votes.
- C. Although Communist gains in this area are probable, may not be on scale achieved in Central Java.
- IV. Best that can be said about elections is that Communists will not gain immediate control over areas in which they won since the various councils are only advisory to governors appointed by Diakarta.
  - A. Commies, nevertheless, will have gained enormous prestige throughout Java.
  - B. They will undoubtedly exert increasing influence over village headmen, the "grass roots" administrators who usually deliver the votes.
  - C. In addition, Communists will be in a greatly improved position to infiltrate local military and police establishments.

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#### BACKGROUND

## Djakarta voting

	Sept. 1955	22 June 1957
Masjumi Communists	200,000 96,000	153,000 134,000 123,000
Nationalist NU	152,000 121,000	102,000

### Central Java voting

	Sept, 1955	17 July 1957 (25% of vote
Communists	2,326,000 (25%)	1,224,000 (50%)
Mationalists	3,032,000 (33%)	614,000 (25%)
NU	1,772,000 (19%)	444,000 (14%)
Masjumi	902,000 (10%)	149,000 (6%)

#### East Java

	Sept, 1955
NU	3,371,000
Communists	2,300,000
Nationalists	2,251,000
Masjumi	1,110,000

# Registered electorate

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East	Java			.000



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